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SIMPLICITY AND CREATION 
Timothy O'Connor 
According to many philosophical theologians, God is metaphysically simple: 
there is no real distinction among His attributes or even between attribute and 
existence itself. Here, I consider only one argument against the simplicity the-
sis. Its proponents claim that simplicity is incompatible with God's having cre-
ated another world, since simplicity entails that God is unchanging across pos-
sible worlds. For, they argue, different acts of creation involve different will-
ings, which are distinct intrinsic states. 1 show that this is mistaken, by sketch-
ing an adequate account of reasons-guided activity that does not require dis-
tinct intrinsic states of willing corresponding to each possible act of creation. 
I Introduction 
According to many philosophical theologians, God is metaphysically sim-
ple: there is no real distinction among His attributes or even between 
attribute and existence itself. God's omniscience is not distinct from His 
omnipotence, which is not distinct from His necessary existence ... which is 
not distinct from God Himself. Even those who affirm this thesis recognize 
that it is a hard saying. But the reflective theist will also recognize that, hard 
as this saying is, there are some fairly weighty considerations in its favor. 
One such consideration stems from the implications of the concept of 
absolutely necessary being. This concept not only underlies an important 
theistic argument, it is also, I believe, a necessary feature of a coherent con-
cept of God, given its connection to a minimal understanding of God's sov-
ereignty over all things.' The path some philosophers trace from necessary 
being to simplicity runs roughly as follows: for a being to exist of absolute 
necessity, there can be no contingent facts about its essential nature. 
Necessary existence cannot just happen to be conjoined with omnipotence 
in this being, for instance, because in that case there would be no possibility 
of explaining why these two attributes were coinstantiated. So there must 
be a tight unity to its nahlre, such that each of its attributes entails the oth-
ers. The only intelligible way this might be is if the relation between "attrib-
utes" (including necessary existence) is that of identity. And if its essential 
nature is metaphysically simple, (it is further argued that) it cannot have 
any contingent intrinsic attributes, either. 
I believe that this argument is resistible. In particular, while 1 accept the 
argument that a necessary being's nature must be tightly unified, I do not 
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see why this cannot fall short of the limiting case of simplicity. But that is 
not to say that I see how its nature could have the requisite unity while 
falling short of simplicity. It is a puzzling notion, and there are no obvious 
strong analogies to guide one's intuitions. Some will take this as evidence 
that the simplicity thesis is true, despite its perplexing character. I will not 
try to argue this matter one way or the other here. Instead, I merely want to 
consider one argument that has been given to discredit the simplicity thesis 
and to show that it is mistaken. 
According to that argument, simplicity is incompatible with the possibili-
ty that God might have created another world (or not have created at all). 
The reason is that God's having created differently (or not having created) 
entails a corresponding difference in His intrinsic state. For He would had 
to have decided or willed to have acted in that different fashion, and decid-
ing to create one world necessarily differs, intrinsically, from deciding to 
create a very different world. So either God is not metaphysically simple or 
His creating this world is somehow bound up with His very being. And 
this last is both impious and absurd. I will rebut this reasoning by sketching 
a plausible model of God's intentional agency on (what the simplicity theo-
rist will view as) the "naive" assumption that God is not metaphysically 
simple. I will then show that, surprisingly, this model can be modified in a 
way that leaves intact certain essential elements while making it compatible 
with the simplicity thesis. 
II The "naive" model of God's intentional agency 
A model of God's agency should show how creation issues from God in a 
way that is explainable in terms of a purpose or desire He had when acting. 
The issues involved in giving an account of intentional explanations are 
numerous and difficult. Accordingly, I claim to show only that there is a not 
obviously unworkable way in which this might go in God's case, the details 
of which must be developed elsewhere.2 Though seemingly modest, this 
will be task enough, as the form of intentional explanation that is needed 
here is one which has been widely thought discredited in relation to human 
action. This has been a mistake, in my view, but in any case the most press-
ing problems for the application of the account to human action are empiri-
cal, not conceptual, and stem from assumptions concerning human beings 
and the wider natural order that need not be made in relation to a transcen-
dent necessary being. 
In recent philosophy, the most popular account of the way reasons 
explain human action is the causal theory of action. Broadly speaking, the 
causal theory holds that some bodily behavior of mine is an action only if it 
is a causal consequence, in an appropriate manner, of factors prominently 
including my having a reason to do so. Bodily movements that are not a 
causal consequence of reasons are mere movements (as with reflexive 
movements). Thus, an agent's control over his activity is taken to reside in 
the causal efficacy of his reasons. Now, many would suppose that this is not 
simply a correct picture of the way reasons explain human actions, but a 
conceptual truth about acting for reasons. To deny that certain of an agent's 
reasons cause his intentional action, such philosophers aver, would be to 
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render it utterly fortuitous from the standpoint of the agent himself. 
This is not at all obvious, however. I will assume without argument here 
that the notion of causation rests on a notion of causal capacities as ontologi-
cally basic. (Causal capacities are not reducible to patterns of actual or coun-
terfactual regularity, nor are they explainable in terms of occurrent relations 
among universals.)' Once one recognizes that this is so, there is no concep-
tual bar to the thought that the way in which capacities are manifested or 
exercised may differ in important and general respects. We have come suc-
cessfully to treat impersonal objects and systems of objects "mechanistical-
ly", i.e., to understand them as having the basis of their capacities in their 
underlying nahlres - their chemical, physical, or genetic constitutions and 
dynamical structures - and as manifesting these powers in observable 
effects as a matter of course in suitable circumstances. On this broad concep-
tion, circumstances prompt the exercise of such a power by, e.g., stimulat-
ing a latent mechanism to action or by removing inhibitors to the activity of 
a poised mechanism. The causal theory of action extends this mechanistic 
paradigm to human agency by treating the state of having a reason to act as 
partly constituting a mechanism of this kind, requiring only the right sort of 
occasion to give rise to an action of the corresponding sort. 
How might a contrasting, non-mechanistic picture of God's agency go? 
There are various complicating issues here, and thus my treatment will be 
quite sketchy. On the naive model, God's activity in generating a contingent 
order is to be thought of, in the first instance, as the direct causing of an 
internal state of intention that a particular determinate state of affairs obtain. 
This is not, importantly, to be treated as an elliptical expression for there 
being some prior state in God that brings about, in rneclumistic fashion, His 
corning to have the intention. Rather, the intention is irreducibly a product 
of God as a free agent. This implies as a corollary that the causal power that 
is manifested in such a case is of a different sort from the mechanistic vari-
ety describable by mathematical functions from circumstances to effects (or 
from circumstances to ranges of effects, in cases of probabilistic, rather than 
deterministic, causation). 
I won't discuss further this contentious notion of personal or agent cau-
sation. I will assume that the reader will grant that it is a coherent basic con-
cept, whatever one's view on its application to human beings. In its applica-
tion to God, the explanatory framework it will engender is roughly this: Let 
it be supposed that God has some purpose P and recognizes that creating 
contingent order C would satisfy P. Suppose further that He subsequently 
(at least in some causal! explanatory order of priority, if not a temporal one) 
generated an intention whose content is that C obtain in order to fulfill P, and 
that C's obtaining is itself an immediate product of that intention. In such a 
circumstance, I claim, the core activity and its product are perfectly well 
explained by reference to God's purpose and His belief that C would satisfy 
it, without any assumption that the activity was necessary given the 
explaining purpose and belief (collectively, "reason"), or even that they 
made it probable. The explanatory connection comprises God's having 
exercised a capacity to freely act for a purpose together with the two-fold 
internal relation of the prior reason to the effective intention-they have a 
common core content (that C satisfies P) and the intention directly refers to the 
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reason. In short, to understand why God freely generates this intention, one 
need only identify its reasons-bearing content. This contrasts with a mecha-
nistic model of intentional action on which an agent's purposes or desires 
and beliefs explain the choice, or formation of an intention, solely in terms 
of an external, causal relationship to it. But it is readily understandable in its 
own terms." 
1111ntentional Explanation and the Simplicity Thesis 
Can the basic model of God's intentional agency just sketched be amended to 
accommodate the simplicity doctrine? At first sight, this seems patently 
hopeless. An essential feature of that explanatory framework is the fit of 
content between prior reason states (such as purposes and beliefs) and the 
agent's ultimate decision, or intention to act here and now. If God's willing 
this particular order of things is contingent, then it might have been differ-
ent. This contradicts the absolute simplicity thesis, as it implies that an 
aspect of God's intrinsic nature in this world - His state of intention that our 
world obtain - might have been different, though God Himself would still 
have existed, which implies that God is distinct from this actual state of 
intention. 
Thomas Aquinas recognized that the simplicity thesis had striking conse-
quences for the understanding of God's creation, when he spoke of the cre-
ation relation as "real for creatures," while "unreal [or merely notional] for 
God." If God strictly is His utterly simple nature, then, in Himself, He must 
be utterly tmchanging across all possible circumstances. There might have 
been any number of different contingent orders, and in each such case, the 
contingent reality would have causally depended on God. Yet God Himself 
would have been intrinsically the same. That is the point of speaking of the 
creation relation as being merely notional for God: for unlike all cases 
involving natural causes (including purposive, free agents), God's causal 
influence does not require any intrinsic change on God's part. 
Clearly, if we are to make sense of this, it cannot involve the idea that 
there is anything like a state of intention whose intrinsic nature would have 
varied in accordance with the state of affairs intended. Yet it just might be 
that the basic explanatory framework outlined above could, after all, be 
applied within a simplicity account by simply deleting the notion of a dis-
tinct, causally effective state of intention that C obtain in order to fulfill P, and 
substituting in its place C itself, i.e., the actual contingent order. The idea 
here is to treat the executive state of intention as an inessential middleman 
in the causal process of purposive agency. God doesn't form an intention to 
create our world and consequently do so, He creates the world directly. His 
activity entirely consists in a causal relation between Himself, who is 
unchanging, and the dependent, contingent reality. The role of matching 
the intentional content of logically prior reasons tl1at a state of intention 
plays within our original model is taken over by the concrete reality at which 
those states are directed. Its nature, too, mirrors the intentional content of 
the explaining reason. 
One might understandably worry at this point that this move makes the 
cognitive aspect of God's agency mysteriously alien, to the point that we've 
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lost our intuitive grip on the model. For on it, there's just (i) an agent with 
reasons for various possible creations, and (ii) a relation of dependency 
between that agent and the actual creation, such that the product might 
have been utterly different, and the agent utterly the same. Surely, one 
wants to say, at some point God has to decide, to intend, to will, or what 
have you that this particular creation be actualized. 
But consider our original, and more familiar model. On that model, God 
has reasons corresponding to different possible courses of action, and then 
causes a state of intention corresponding to one, which state in tum causes 
the intended contingent order. That is: there is (i) an agent with reasons for 
various possible creations, and (ii) a relation of dependency between that 
agent and the actual intention (which results in the creation), such that the 
intention might have been utterly different, and the agent (until just prior to 
the intention in the order of explanation) utterly the same. Whatever mys-
tery resides in conceiving the dependency between God and creation in the 
intention-less, simplicity-based model is perhaps equally present between 
agent and intention in the original model. But I would prefer to say that 
there is no mystery (here, at any rate) in either model. It only appears to be 
so if one misunderstands the role of an intention by thinking of it as the ulti-
mate locus of personal agency - as a state in virtue of which all subsequent 
immediate effects are to be attributed to the agent as His effects, as aspects 
of His action. Within the broadly agent-causal account of which both mod-
els are particular versions, the locus of agency is not within some special 
kind of intrinsic state, but rather within the exercise of causal power in bring-
ing about such a state (or an external state of affairs, as on the simplicity-
based model). 
If this is right, one might ask what the function is of discrete states of inten-
tion in agents who have them (such as ourselves). But the answer is obvious 
enough on a moment's thought: they are central to the guiding of actions 
within ordinary purposive agents. Our actions perforce involve enormously 
complex chains of microphysical events within and around us. The having 
of separate, content-bearing states of intention for each action is a way of har-
nessing such causal mechanisms within our bodies and environment, often 
triggering into action mechanistically-encoded, latent action routines - think 
of the unconscious completion of a complicated dance routine - and always 
guiding the completion of behavior through complex feedback mechanisms. 
Such functions are presumably unnecessary in God's case. 
At this point, I should address a possible misunderstanding one might 
have concerning the model of God's agency I am proposing on behalf the 
simplicity theorist. It may seem that the model is committed to denying that 
willing is in any sense an attribute of God. This would be passing strange 
for an account of irreducibly personal agency and is contrary to the express 
claims of most simplicity theorists.5 Is it not commonly held that willing 
Himself is part of God's essence and that in willing Himself He wills creat-
ed reality? 
My account is compatible with these claims. First, my model has indicat-
ed nothing about God's intrinsic, simple nature other than its embodying 
reasons for creating each of those contingent orders that are possible. Let us 
suppose, then, that an involuntary willing of - a wanting or U appetite" for -
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Himself, the supreme good, is an "aspect" of God's rich, yet metaphysically 
simple nature. Can we further speak of God as willing that this world exist, 
given that He has caused it to be? We can, although we must take care to 
understand just what such a willing is on the account. Unlike a human will-
ing or decision that something be the case, it will not be or involve a distinc-
tive intrinsic state of God. Recall the "naive" model of God's agency and 
suppose that it correctly captured the essential feature of human free 
agency. If so, we might naturally say that human decisions of this sort were 
the causally complex events of the agent's causing an intrinsic state of intention 
that 0. The constituent intention would be distinct from other states of the 
agent and mark a change in the agent from his previous cognitive state. On 
the simplicity doctrine, God is not other than His simple, intrinsic state. So 
God's willing of this world will not involve such an internal change. 
Instead, it will be the circumstance of God's creating the world to satisfy some 
purpose. Had God created differently, the only difference would be in the 
contingent order, not in God. If we chose to speak in terms of a "relational 
attribute" of God, rather than of the state of affairs of His being causally 
related to the world, then we would say that God's willing this world is His 
being its creator - which, intrinsically, is nothing other than His essence of 
willing Himself. 
In dealing with the simplicity thesis, we must be careful in this way to 
separate God's intrinsic from his relational properties. Otherwise, we might 
be tempted to say that even our amended model is not compatible with 
God's being the same regardless of what world He happened to create. For 
does He not have in our own world the inessential properties of having cre-
ated this world and having willed to create this world? As we've seen, if the 
amended model of God's agency is correct, the presence or absence of these 
properties implies no intrinsic difference in God, no more than the presence 
or absence of the property being ten feet away from Theaetetus implies an 
intrinsic difference in Socrates. 
A final matter I will briefly consider here is whether my simplicity-based 
model of God's purposive agency is compatible with the possibility that He 
might not have created anything at all. Norman Kretzmann has argued in 
the context of Aquinas's theological system that there is strong pressure to 
say that God must have created something or other, though it may well 
have been open to Him to create any of a number of contingent orders.6 The 
reason is that there is no plausible account of how an absolutely perfect God 
might have a resistible motivation - one consideration among other, compet-
ing considerations - for creating something rather than nothing. (It obvious-
ly cannot have to do with any sort of utility, for example.) The best general 
understanding of God's being motivated to create at all - one which in 
places Aquinas himself comes very close to endorsing - is to see it as reflect-
ing the fact that God's very being, which is goodness, necessarily diffuses 
itself. Perfect goodness will naturally communicate itself outwardly; God 
who is perfect goodness will naturally create, generating a dependent reali-
ty that imperfectly reflects that goodness. 
I find this claim highly plausible. Even if one rejected this claim, howev-
er, it is difficult to envision a coherent scenario in which God eternally 
chooses not to create. On my model, for example, God's positively willing 
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not to create requires His having some reason for not doing so. As 
Kretzmann asks, what kind of reason could that be? God could not benefit 
from that choice. One might suggest that rather than positively choosing 
not to create, God might have simply refrained from deciding one way or 
other. This is a familiar circumstance for human beings, who often have a 
motivation to uncover more relevant information, and sometimes stall in 
the hope that the choice will be "taken from their hands." But there can be 
no analogous factors in God. I am inclined, then, to judge that Kretzmann's 
claim is correct. Fully motivating this position requires showing that it does 
not compromise God's absolute independence of all things, but I will not 
pursue this here. 
IV Conclusion 
I have tried to show how the simplicity theorist can make out an account of 
God's contingent, purposive agency in creation. Even if I have been success-
ful, an important worry remains about the apparent complexity of reason 
states on the second model. (On it, remember, God has any number of dis-
tinct reasons for creating a variety of different possible worlds.) This is just a 
special case of the more general worry about how to render intelligible the 
idea that simplicity is compatible with a "richness" of nature in virtue of 
which it is meaningful to speak of "(absolute) power," "knowledge," and a 
host of other attributes in relation to such a being. I will have to leave this 
very perplexing matter as an unresolved puzzle for the committed simplici-
ty theorist - here I've merely tried to leave the simplicity doctrine in a little 
better shape than I found iF 
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NOTES 
1. I have argued this point in an unpublished lecture, "The God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Anselm?," which I gave at the University of St. Andrews 
in April 1997. 
2. I develop an account of the model I will give in the text (in relation to 
human action) in my "Agent Causation," in T. O'Connor, ed., Agents, Causes, 
and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995). 
3. Problems with reductionist approaches are well known and have been 
extensively discussed in the literature. TI1e higher-order-relation-among-univer-
sals approach has been independently advanced by Fred Dretske, David 
Armstrong, and Michael Tooley. See "Laws of Nature" (Philosophy of Science 44, 
(1977), 248-68), A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1(97), and Causation: A Realist Approach (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 
respectively. I argue against this type of account in Causation and the Will 
(unpublished manuscript). 
4. Since Donald Davidson's essay, "Actions, Reasons, and Causes," vari-
ous theorists of action have given a number of reasons to suppose that accounts 
of intentional explanation that do not appeal to the causal efficacy of the agent's 
reasons must fail. I cannot address these worries here. But I have done so at 
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length elsewhere. See my 1/ Agent Causation" (cited in note 2). 
5. See, for example, Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Ia.19 and Summa 
Contra Gentiles 1.72-86. 
6. See most recently his Wilde Lectures, The Metaphysics of Theism: 
Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), pp. 220-225. 
7. This paper was developed from a briefer discussion of its topic within a 
series of lectures 1 gave at the University of St. Andrews (in April 1997) under 
the heading God and Ultimate Explanation. 1 thank the audience on that occasion, 
especially John Haldane, Thomas 0' Andrea, and Tim Kenyon, for their com-
ments. The research and writing of that material was supported by grants from 
The Pew Evangelical Scholars Program and the Lord Gifford bequest at the 
University of St. Andrews. 
